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All self-respecting legal history is supposed to end by the twentieth century.  As 
we approach our own lives, experience and training—and those events that we have 
actually witnessed—we allegedly lose that "objectivity" which makes the "science" of 
history itself possible.  Certainly, there is no point in burdening the reader with the 
"original" materials, including cases and statutes, that make up the bulk of any legal 
education.  But there are good reasons to reflect on our own legal century from an 
"historical perspective."   
 First, we can already discern certain forests through the trees that surround us.  
The early years of this century saw the development of a powerful new school of 
"sociological jurisprudence," or the "new jurisprudence," growing from the writing and 
judicial opinions of jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis Brandeis, and 
Roscoe Pound.  This new approach to judicial law making set the juristic underpinnings 
for Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal" and the activist Supreme Court of the post war era.  
Optimistic and expansive in spirit, the "new jurisprudence" combined the utilitarian 
philosophy of Benthamism with an aggressive new judicial instrumentalism. 
                                                          
∗ The following has been excerpted from Daniel R. Coquillette, The Anglo-American Legal Heritage: 
Introductory Materials (North Carolina Academic Press, 1999), Chapters 14 and 15, pp. 557-630, by 
permission of the publisher and author.  The book was designed to make the history of law more accessible 
to legal professionals.  [For information on ordering this book, please see the Carolina Academic Press 
website at: www.caplaw.com.] 
2 On a very different note has been the analysis of modern legal movements 
developed in Germany by Georg Hegel and Max Weber and applied, at least in part, in 
this country by theorists such as Duncan Kennedy, Morton Horwitz, and Roberto Unger.  
Both Weber and Unger have identified tendencies in modern legal systems that are 
cutting away at belief in a neutral rule of law and are threatening the legitimacy of the 
legal profession and the courts alike.  In many ways, the observations of these writers 
challenge future generations of common lawyers to either reform their heritage or revert 
to political and economic tribalism. 
A. The "New Jurisprudence" 
The life of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (1841-1935) spans much of American 
history.  He was born into the aristocratic world of old Massachusetts, and was related to 
four great families, the Olivers, the Wendells, the Holmeses and the Jacksons.  He met 
men such as John Quincy Adams, who had, in turn, intimately known the founders of the 
Republic.  Holmes himself fought and was wounded in the most terrible American 
experience of all time, the Civil War.  Yet, his term as a Supreme Court Justice, from 
1902 to 1932, saw the emergence of a new social, economic, and juristic era, whose 
"modern" influence we still feel strongly.  Alger Hess, his law clerk, was prosecuted as a 
traitor by Richard Nixon.  Louis Brandeis was Holmes' protégé.  Many are still alive who 
remember clearly meeting and discussing law with the great old man, and I was once in a 
room with five of them.  Holmes' life links us directly with the birth of the Republic. 
But Holmes was always, as Commager said, "a generation ahead of his time."1  
And nothing symbolizes that better than his lectures and writings in the 1880's, 
particularly three:  1) the incomparable The Spirit of the Common Law (Boston, 1881), 
based on his Lowell Institute Lectures of 1880; 2) "The Path of the Law," an address at 
the dedication of a new hall at Boston University Law School in 1897, published in 10 
Harvard Law Review 451 (1897); and 3) "Natural Law" published in 32 Harvard Law 
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3Review (1918).  Such writing founded the "new jurisprudence," and led to the great 
departure from formalism that would mold American constitutional jurisprudence for the 
next century.  The Materials for this chapter include excerpts from The Common Law 
(1881) and "Natural Law" (1918), written nearly forty years apart.  The next chapter, XV, 
contains excerpts from "The Path of the Law" (1897).2 
In November, 1880, Holmes addressed a hushed audience containing James Barr 
Ames, James Bradley Thayer, John Chipman Gray, and Christopher Columbus Langdell 
at the Lowell Institute Lectures.  This was literally a "who's who" of the traditional 
natural law and common law schools of jurisprudence, jurists who emphasized the 
"gospel of Savigny" that the common law was fixed and immutable, almost like the laws 
of natural science itself.  Holmes issued a direct challenge to them. 
 
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed."3 
 
This challenge was repeated a year later by The Common Law (1881). 
 
"What has been said will explain the failure of all theories which consider 
the law only from its formal side, whether they attempt to deduce the 
corpus from a priori postulates, or fall into the humbler error of supposing 
the science of the law to reside in the elegantia juris, or logical cohesion 
of part with part.  The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and 
never reaching, consistency.  It is forever adopting new principles from 
life at one end, and it always retain old ones from history at the other, 
which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off.  It will become entirely 
consistent only when it ceases to grow."4 
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4O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (ed. Mark D. Howe, London, 1988), 32.  
 
4 This was the essence of what Roscoe Pound would call "sociological 
jurisprudence."  As Commager put it, it was, "[A] new way of thinking about law and 
applying it.  It was a shift from absolutes to relatives, from doctrines to practices, from 
passive—and therefore pessimistic-determinism to creative—and therefore optimistic-
freedom."5 
 But this was far from rationalist, codified utilitarianism.  Holmes believed firmly 
in the history and tradition of the Common law as an essential part of a growing, living 
body of doctrine.  As he put it in The Common Law: 
 
"However much we may codify the law into a series of seemingly self-
sufficient propositions, these propositions will be but a phase in a 
continuous growth.  To understand their scope fully, to know how they 
will be dealt with by judges trained in the past which the law embodies, 
we must ourselves know something of that past.  The history of what the 
law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is."6 
 
Here was more of Mansfield than Bentham, and more of the secret innovative soul of 
Coke—who changed the law by judicial reports—than the self-declared legal science of 
Bacon. 
 But the glory of the "new jurisprudence" was its willingness to incorporate the 
lessons of social science and utilitarian with the goals of judicial instrumentalism.  At the 
Lowell Lectures, along with the John Chipman Grays and the Langdells, also sat the 
young Louis Dembitz Brandeis (1856-1941).  Although his great sociological brief in 
Muller v. Oregon (1908), the first "Brandeis Brief," was still twenty-eight years in the 
future, Brandeis was to become a great exponent of Holmes' principles—both in his 
distinguished Boston law practice and during twenty-three vitally significant years on the 
United States Supreme Court (1916-1939).  Together with Harlan Stone, Benjamin 
Cardozo, and Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis was responsible for making sociological 
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5jurisprudence, after Roosevelt's 1937 "court packing" crisis, "the all but official doctrine 
of the Court."7 
 Holmes' doctrines also had a great impact on legal education.  Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, who had established the "case method" at Harvard Law School, said 
in 1886 that "[L]aw is a science" and that law books were "to us all that laboratories of 
the university are to the chemists and physicists. . . ."8  Langdell resigned in 1895, after 
twenty-five years.  Twenty years later, in 1916, Roscoe Pound took the deanship.  During 
the next twenty years, he established "sociological jurisprudence" as a corner stone of a 
new approach to legal education. 
 "Sociological jurisprudence," Pound's own term, was very different from 
Langdell's "science."  In Pound's words, it was  
 
"a process, an activity, not merely a body of knowledge or a fixed order of 
construction.  It is a doing of things, not a serving as passive instruments 
through which mathematical formulas and mechanical laws realize 
themselves in the eternally appointed way.  The engineer is judged by 
what he does.  His work is judged by its adequacy to the purposes for 
which it is done, not by its conformity to some ideal form of a traditional 
plan.  We are beginning . . . to think of jurist and judge and lawmaker in 
the same way.  We are coming to study the legal order instead of debating 
as to nature of law.  We are thinking of interests, claims, demands, not of 
rights; of what we have to secure or satisfy, not exclusively of the 
institutions by which we have sought to secure or satisfy them, as if those 
institutions were ultimate things existing for themselves.  (Interpretations 
of Legal History, p. 152)"9 
 
 At its core, the new jurisprudence was, in Pound's words, "a movement for 
pragmatism as a philosophy of law; for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the 
human condition they are to govern rather than to assure first principles; for putting the 
human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an 
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8Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard (Cambridge, 1967), 175.  
 
9Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind, supra, 378.  
 
6instrument."10  Inherent in this new approach to law was both a new attitude as to the 
proper source of judicial principles and a new test of what made a law good or bad. 
 
In the last century we studied law from within.  The jurists of today are 
studying it from without.  The past century sought to develop completely 
and harmoniously the fundamental principles which jurists discovered by 
metaphysics or by history.  The jurists of today seek to enable and to 
compel lawmaking and also the interpretation and application of legal 
rules, to take more account and more intelligent account, of the social 
facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied.  
Where the last century studied law in the abstract, they insist upon study 
of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines.  Where 
the last century prepared for legislation by study of other legislation 
analytically, they insist upon sociological study in connection with legal 
study in preparation for legislation.  Where the last century held 
comparative law the best foundation for wise lawmaking, they hold it not 
enough to compare the laws themselves, but that even more their social 
operation must be studied and the effects which they produce, if any, 
when put in action.  Where the last century studied only the making of 
law, they hold it necessary to study as well the means of making legal 
rules effective. 
(The Spirit of the Common Law, pp. 212-213).11 
 The impact of this new approach on legal study and legal policy, particularly in 
the area of criminal law, was "immediate and far reaching."12  But, in Commager's words, 
"[I]ts most dramatic, and perhaps its most consequential results were to be found . . . in 
the area of constitutional law."13  Formulated in lectures and legal writings of a man who 
had met John Quincy Adams and fought in the Civil War, the "new jurisprudence" was to 
become the ideological backbone of the "Warren Court," and the monumental cases of 
Gideon, Miranda, Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and Griswold v. Connecticut are its 
lasting heritage.14 
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14See Archibald Cox, The Warren Court (Cambridge, 1968).  
 
7 B. The Qualities of Modern Law and the "Postliberal Society" 
 Just as the "new jurisprudence" grew from the instrumental optimism of 
nineteenth century America, but reached its full fruition decades later, so the "critical 
realism" movement of the last twenty years grew from the hard lesson of the economic 
"Great Depression" in Europe and America and the World Wars.  The first to articulate 
the elements of modern law in ways that reflected these lessons was Max Weber (1864-
1920), the great German economist and scholar. 
 In his Law in Economy and Society, Weber identified three "qualities of modern 
law" that clearly challenged the existence of "law" as a concept independent of raw 
political and economic power.  The first was "specialization."  In Weber's words, "the 
legal ignorance of the layman will increase" as legal rules became more complex and 
technical.15  Equally important was the "anti-formalistic tendencies of modern legal 
development," i.e., the tendency of courts to depart from rigid, objective rules to resolve 
cases, and to rely more on subjective "economical utilitarian meaning."16  Finally, there 
was the "lay justice and corporate tendencies in the modern legal profession," i.e., the 
increasing reliance on subjective lay decision making—whether by jury, arbitration or 
mediator—and the erosion of significant distinction between "private" and "public" legal 
decision making.17   
 Weber warns that there is a price to be paid for these developments.  As law 
becomes increasingly obscure, technical, subjective and private, the source of its moral 
force is eroded.  In Weber's words: 
 
"Whatever form law and legal practice may come to assume under the 
impact of these various influences, it will be inevitable that, as a result of 
technical and economic developments, the legal ignorance of the layman 
will increase.  The use of jurors and similar lay judges will not suffice to 
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8stop the continuous growth of the technical element in the law and hence 
of its character as a specialists' domain.  Inevitably, the notion must 
expand that the law is a rational technical apparatus, which is continually 
transformable in the light of experiential considerations and devoid of all 
sacredness of content."18   
 A law "devoid of all sacredness of content" would, in the eyes of Blackstone or 
Coke, lead quickly to tyranny, yet Weber saw this as an inevitable result of the new 
"sociological jurisprudence"—the "dark side," as it were, of the promise of legal 
instrumentalism.  Again in Weber's words: 
 
This fate may be obscured by the tendency of acquiescence in the existing 
law, which is growing in many ways for several reasons, but it cannot 
really be stayed.  All of the modern sociological and philosophical 
analyses, many of which are of a high scholarly value, can only contribute 
to strengthen this impression, regardless of the content of their theories 
concerning the nature of law and the judicial process.19 
 Certainly the "deconstruction" of  "sacred texts" of the law, including 
Blackstone's Commentaries, has been one product of modern critical legal scholarship.  A 
particularly good example is Duncan Kennedy's controversial "The Structure of 
Blackstone's Commentaries," 28 Buffalo Law Review 209 (1979), excerpted in the 
Materials, supra.  Kennedy, a leader of the "critical studies movement" and now Carter 
Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard, acknowledges the influence of E.P. 
Thompson, discussed above in Chapter XII, and Hegel.  His purpose in analyzing 
Blackstone is to strip away the pretense of Blackstone's "desire to legitimate the legal 
status quo" and to establish a method of  "discovering hidden political intentions beneath 
the surface of legal exposition."20 
 Weber's message has been further developed in the work of Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, another law professor at Harvard.  In his view, the rule of law has been "the soul 
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9of the modern state."21  In particular, belief in a neutral, all pervading rule of law and a 
careful division between state and private ordering is at the heart of our notion of a 
liberal, constitutional state.  But, argues Unger, the rule of law is currently in 
"disintegration," and our belief in the United States as a "liberal" state is actually belief in 
a myth.  Rather, we are now entering a "post liberal" society which is marked by a 
gradual abandonment of formal, neutral, public rulemaking.22   
 Two forces are leading us to this end.  The first is "the overt intervention of 
government in areas previously regarded as beyond the proper reach of state action," a 
tendency that Unger labels the "welfare state" function.23  The second is "the reverse side 
of the events just enumerated:  the gradual approximation of state and society, of the 
public and the private sphere."  This Unger calls the "corporatist" tendency, borrowing a 
term from Weber.24  The latter tendency is well illustrated by nominally "private" 
entities, such as utilities, hospitals, private universities, and large industrial enterprises, 
that actually have acquired bodies of rules, powers and responsibilities that are very like 
public governments.  According to Unger: 
  
 Corporatism's most obvious influence on the law is its contribution 
to the growth of a body of rules that break down the traditional distinction 
between public and private law.  Thus, administrative, corporate, and 
labor law merge into a body of social law that is more applicable to the 
structure of private-public organizations than to official conduct or private 
transactions.  But though this development undermines the conventional 
contrast of public and private law, it does not necessarily destroy the 
broader difference between the law of the state and the internal, privately 
determined regulations of private associations.  Insofar as private law is 
laid down by the state, it too is, in this more comprehensive sense, public. 
 The deepest and least understood impact of corporatism is the one 
it has on the very distinction between the law of the state and the 
spontaneously produced normative order of nonstate institutions.  As 
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10
private organizations become bureaucratized in response to the same 
search for impersonal power that attracts government to the rule of law 
principle, they begin to acquire the features, and to suffer the problems, of 
the state.  At the same time, the increasing recognition of the power these 
organizations exercise, in a quasi-public manner, over the lives of their 
members makes it even harder to maintain the distinction between state 
action and private conduct.  Finally, the social law of institutions is a law 
compounded of state-authored rules and of privately sponsored regulations 
or practices; its two elements are less and less capable of being separated.  
All these movements, which tend to destroy the public character of law, 
carry forward a process that begins in the failure of liberal society to keep 
its promise of concentrating all significant power in government. 
 The tendency of large corporate organizations to become 
bureaucratized and to produce a body of rules with many of the 
characteristics of state law should not be confused with an increasing 
regulation of the corporation by the state.  In fact, quite the opposite may 
be true:  the bureaucratization of corporate institutions may be associated 
with their ability to become relatively independent power centers with 
decisive influence over government agencies.25 
The growth of the welfare state and the power of corporatism eat at the neutral rule of 
law in at least three ways.  First, the welfare state encourages "open-ended standards and 
general clauses in legislation" that take away the certainty and objectivity of legal rules.  
Second, law in the welfare state turns "from formalistic to purposive or policy-oriented 
styles of legal reasoning and from concerns with formal justice to an interest in 
procedural and substantive justice."26  Finally, the erosion of the ideals of formal justice 
eventually leads to a breakdown in the difference between public and private and 
between law and pure economic and political power. 
 
 The decline in the distinctiveness of legal reasoning is connected 
with the need administrators and judges have of reaching out to the 
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26Id., 488.  Unger defines "formal," "substantive" and "procedural" justice as follows:  "An ideal of justice 
is formal when it makes the uniform application of general rules the keystone of justice or when it 
establishes principles whose validity is supposedly independent of choices among conflicting values.  It is 
procedural when it imposes conditions on the legitimacy of the processes by which social advantages are 
exchanged or distributed.  It is substantive when it governs the actual outcome of distributive decisions or 
of bargains.  Thus, in contact law, the doctrine that bargains are enforceable given certain externally visible 
manifestations of intent exemplifies formal justice; the demand that there be equality of bargaining power 
among contracting parties illustrates procedural justice; and the prohibition of exchanges of two 
performances of unequal value, however value may be assessed, represents substantive justice."  Id.  
 
11
substantive ideals of different groups, of drawing upon a conventional 
morality or a dominant tradition.  These changes in the substance and 
method of law also help undercut the identity of legal institutions and of 
the legal profession.  Courts begin to resemble openly first administrative, 
then other political institutions.  Thus, the difference between lawyers and 
other bureaucrats or technicians starts to disappear.27 
In these predictions, Unger follows and develops the early observations of Weber.28 
 Suddenly, however, Unger advances two extraordinarily original—and 
alternative—hypotheses about legal history itself.  In his words: 
 
 The first hypothesis might be summarized by the metaphor of the 
closed circle.  It would present the entire history of law as one of 
movement toward a certain point, followed by a return to the origin.  We 
have seen how, in Western legal history, bureaucratic law, with its public 
and positive rules, builds upon customary practices, and how this 
bureaucratic law is in turn partly superseded by the rule of law, with its 
commitment to the generality and the autonomy of legal norms.  The 
welfare trend in postliberal society moves the rule of law ideal back in the 
direction of bureaucratic law by undermining the social and ideological 
bases of that deal.  The corporatist tendency and the communitarian 
aspirations that follow it begin to subvert bureaucratic law itself.  Thus, 
they prepare the way for the return to the custom of each group as the 
fundamental and almost exclusive instrument of social order.29 
 In short, Unger proposes as hypothesis that legal history could be purely cyclical, 
rather than progressive.  This is a rather pessimistic view.  Is it right? 
 The "stages" of Unger's cycle are worth examining closely, and they also provide 
a convenient way to re-examine and review the materials in this book.  Here is a rough 
diagram of Unger's cycle: 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
27Id. 
 
28Unger's observation also reflect the historical theories of scholars such as Morton Horwitz, whose The 
Transformation of American Law (1780-1860) (Cambridge, 1977) traced what he found to be an 
"emergence of an instrumental conception of law" which led to a breakdown in true distinctions between 
law and politics and economics.  See id., xi-xvii, 1-30. 
 
29Materials, infra.  
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II. Bureaucratic  [Feudal] 
["Positive rules built on 
customary practices"] 
 
I. Custom  [Tribal] 
"custom of each group 
fundamental and almost 
exclusive instrument of 
social order" 
 
 III.  Rule of Law  [Liberal] 
["Liberal" State with 
"commitment to 
generality and autonomy 
of legal norms"] 
 
IV. Welfare State  [Postliberal] 
["back in the direction of bureaucratic 
law by undermining the social and 
ideological bases of [rule of law] ideal." 
Then the "corporalist tendency and the 
communitarian aspiration that follow it 
begin to subvert bureaucratic law itself," 
thus cycling back to the "custom."] 
 
 
 
 I have taken one liberty with Unger's terminology and inserted the words "tribal," 
"feudal," "liberal" and "postliberal."  In particular, I like to use "feudal" with 
"bureaucratic" to describe Unger's "Stage II."  That is because a society with "positive 
rules built on customary practices" which also has a strong notion of "corporatist" and 
"welfare" elements—i.e., where the public and private spheres are commingled and where 
there is a paternalistic responsibility for collective welfare—closely resembles the 
"feudal" model that we discussed at length in Chapter IV. 
 How does this chart reflect this course and the "progression" or, if Unger's cycle is 
correct, the "flow" of Anglo-American legal history?  Obviously, Stage I, "Custom," 
would correspond with our Chapter II, the "Anglo-Saxon Period," particularly the period 
before 900 AD. Stage II, "Bureaucratic," closely resembles the evolution of a positive law 
based on custom during the "feudal" period of English as pointed out above.  This period 
is covered in our Chapters III, IV, and V.  The development of royal courts, the treatise 
Bracton, the invention of formulary pleading, and the great medieval statutes, such as 
 
13
Quia Emptores (1290) and De Donis (1285) could all be seen as part of this stage.  Stage 
III, "Rule of Law," with a "commitment to the generality and the autonomy of legal 
norms," could be seen as the essence of the struggles led by Coke and other great common 
lawyers during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leading to the great 
confrontation of the Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke Reports, 63 (1608),30  The Five 
Knights Case, 3 State Trials 1 (1627),31 the "Petition of Right" (1628),32 the Bill of Rights 
(1689),33 and in a very real sense, our own Constitution. 
 These three "stages" are frequently described as a progressive evolution from pure 
tribalism to our contemporary, modern "rule of law," as extolled in countless law school 
graduation and bar admissions ceremonies.  But here is where Unger becomes 
controversial.  He, like Weber, sees forces at work in our modern legal system and state 
that are undermining the rule of law and making it a fiction or a myth.  He advances, 
therefore, at least one hypothesis that sees us returning to a feudal or bureaucratic 
["welfare"] state, where public and private norms again commingle, and eventually, to 
where the "corporatist tendency and the communitarian aspirations that follow it begin to 
subvert bureaucratic law itself"… leading to "the return to the custom of each group as the 
fundamental and almost exclusive instrument of social order."34  Some see today a return 
in America to feudal corporate entities and to vast, faceless paternal bureaucracies, each 
with their own rules, and then to fragmented economic, ethnic, racial, and socio-political 
"special interest" or "tribal" groups.  Such a "balkanization" of American political life, 
away from consensus politics to the politics of "special interest groups," and to 
"fractionalized politics" would make Unger's cycle seem credible. 
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 But Unger had a second hypothesis.  This theory is a bit more optimistic.  Instead 
of an eternal cycle, legal history may "spiral" upward.  In Unger's own words: 
 
  An alternative approach to the prospects of modern society and to 
their legal implications might be represented by the metaphor of a spiral 
that reverses direction without returning to its starting point.  This would 
mean that individual freedom could be rescued from the demise of the rule 
of law and brought into harmony with the reassertion of communitarian 
concerns.  It would also signify that the capacity to see and to treat each 
form of social life as a creation rather than as a fate could survive the 
disintegration of public and positive law reconciled with the sense of an 
immanent order in society.35 
 What would be required to ensure an upward spiral rather than a continuous cycle 
without progress?  Unger believes that legal systems must refine "ancient methods for the 
dispersal of power" while also distinguishing between "legitimate and illegitimate uses of 
power" and between "permissible and prohibited inequalities."36  He also believes that 
the law must retain what Weber termed "sacredness of content," i.e., not just be an 
arbitrary exercise of power promoting arbitrary ends.37  Again, in Unger's words: 
  
 The problem of power carries us to the other aspect of the spiral 
like process I envisage.  Unless people regain the sense that the practices 
of society represent some sort of natural order instead of a set of arbitrary 
choices, they cannot hope to escape from the dilemma of unjustified 
power.  But how can this perception of immanent order be achieved in the 
circumstances of modern society?38 
 The Roman system governed the entire civilized world for centuries, but 
disappeared without a trace in England.  There was a complete return to warring tribes.  
Elegantly written commercial codes which governed shipments of English tin to Syria, 
and Egyptian rings to the fingers of wealthy English farmers, were replaced with crude 
"price lists" to govern blood feud negotiations, i.e., "If an ear is cut off, 30 shillings shall 
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be paid…"39  The bricks that formed the walls for central heating systems within the 
walls of spacious villas were literally quarried out to make walls to surround primitive 
huts.  Could it happen again?  Photographs in 1994 of abandoned schools and factories in 
the former Yugoslavia, covered with weeds as ethnic tribes fight from village to village, 
remind us that social order, upon which civilization and prosperity rest, can be fragile 
indeed. 
 But the Roman law chapter was not included in this book at the beginning to 
make some philosophical or moral point.  It is there because Roman law, in fact, came 
before the Anglo-Saxon period.  Does this confirm Unger's grimmer hypothesis?  In one 
way, probably so.  At least Western legal science as manifested in English history can not 
be regarded as purely "progressive."  But the Roman law chapter, Chapter I, does not just 
conclude with Roman times.  Rather, it extends to writings by Francis Bacon, during the 
English Renaissance, and by John Adams, during the dawn of American 
constitutionalism.  Both relied heavily on Roman learning.40  Indeed, throughout the 
history of English law we return to the influence of Roman legal science, in Bracton's De 
Legibus of 1265 AD,41  in the development of the notion of equity by St. German in his 
classic Doctor and Student (1523),42 in the specialized "civilian" courts of Doctors' 
Commons which flourished from 1511 to 1858, over three centuries,43 and in the 
commercial law jurisprudence of Holt and Mansfield,44 to name but a few examples.  
Seen from this perspective, Roman legal science was not "lost," but recycled , and 
                                                          
 
39Materials, supra, Chapter II.  
 
40Id., Chapter I.  
 
41Id., Chapter III.  
 
42Id., Chapter VI.  
 
43Id., Chapter VII.  
 
44Id., Chapter XII.  See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Civilan Writers of Doctors' Commons, London (Berlin, 
1988), 271-296, for a full account of Roman law influence on Holt and Mansfield. 
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recycled in a form both more humane and arguably more sophisticated.  The commercial 
law of Mansfield rivaled that of Ulpian and Gaius, but it did not have to be illustrated by 
the sale of slaves—at least in England. 
 Much depends on whether our legal science is progressive.  "Progress" in 
technology can be a two-edged sword unless it is accompanied by a stable and humane 
social order, as the Cold War reminds us.  Search for this social order unites us, as 
lawyers, with a long line of lawyers, extending into the distant past, who worked for the 
same goal.  As Unger concludes: 
  
 The search for this latent and living law—not the law of 
prescriptive rules or of bureaucratic policies, but the elementary code of 
human interaction—has been the staple of the lawyer's art whenever this 
art was practiced with most depth and skill.  What united the great Islamic 
'ulama,' the Roman jurisconsults, and the English common lawyers was 
the sense they shared that the law, rather than being made chiefly by 
judges and princes, was already present in society itself.  Throughout 
history there has been a bond between the legal profession and the search 
for an order inherent in social life.  The existence of this bond suggests 
that the lawyer's insight, which preceded the advent of the legal order, can 
survive its decline. 
 The same processes that promise to reconcile freedom and 
transcendence with community and immanent order also threaten to 
sacrifice the former to the latter.  In a brief passage of his Republic, Plato 
evokes a society in which men, reduced to animal contentment, have lost 
the capacity of self-criticism together with the sense of incompleteness.  
He calls this society the City of Pigs.  The significance of the historical 
tendencies discussed in this chapter lies in this: with a single gesture they 
frighten us with the image of the City of Pigs and entice us with the 
prospect of the Heavenly City.  By offering us the extremes of good and 
evil, they speak at once to what is bestial and to what is sublime in our 
humanity.45 
This much is certainly true.  The history of Anglo-American law leaves us with no easy 
answers.  At the Saxon "Law Rock," or on the meadow at Runnymede, or in the Privy 
Council Chamber as Edward Coke alone stood fast before the enraged King, or in a small 
room in Braintree as John Adams begins to draft the Constitution, or on the picket lines, 
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or on the battlefields of world wars or Selma, progress in legal institutions has been won 
only through struggle and has been retained only through constant vigilance and effort. 
 
C. Law and History 
What is the fundamental significance of history in our law and legal system?  One 
answer is that we are, of course, part of an historical process ourselves, a process of 
extraordinary continuity over centuries.  As Frederick William Maitland put it, "Such is 
the unity of all history that any one who endeavors to tell a piece of it must feel that his 
first sentence tears a seamless web."46 
But what is the significance, in practical terms, of being "part of history?"  This is 
where the true debates begin and where, in the end, legal historians and reflective lawyers 
make their own individual judgments.  
First, I would like to return to an important hypothesis set out earlier in the 
Materials, in Chapter IX.  This is Maine's theory of legal change.  Sir Henry Sumner 
Maine (1822-1888), Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, was famous for his 
great book Ancient Law (1888).47  He was a leading proponent of "historical 
jurisprudence" and of evolutionary views of law.  Today he is largely known for some of 
his great sweeping "principles" of legal history, such as "[W]e may say that the 
movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract."48  As we have seen, feudal law was dominated by "status" relationships.  Land 
                                                          
46Sir Frederick Pollock, Frederick William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Times of 
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47Maine did, of course, write many more books, including Village Communities (1871), Early History of 
Institutions (1875), Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (1883) and International Law (1888).  
 
48"The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing the law of progress thus 
indicated, which, whatever be its value, seems to me to be sufficiently ascertained.  All the forms of Status 
taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the 
powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family.  If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage 
of the best writers, to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such 
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."  Henry Sumner Maine, 
Ancient Law (10th ed., 1884, London) 164-165.  
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could not even be left by will.  Your identity, or "status," or birth was all important.49  
Later developments, such as eighteenth century English commercial law, saw an 
emergence of "will" based legal doctrines, such as consensual contracts.50  These 
doctrines put a premium on an individual's act of will, what an individual did, rather than 
who the person was.  But does this make the law "progressive?"  And what about the 
modern developments observed by Weber and Unger that are stripping away genuine 
individual autonomy, such as vast bureaucracies and a "corporate" state?51  Can anyone 
make the kind of assertion about legal history that Maine did and be correct? 
One of Maine's other well known assertions is as follows: 
"A general proposition of some value may be advanced with respect to the 
agencies by which Law is brought into harmony with society.  These 
instrumentalities seem to me to be three in number, Legal Fictions, Equity 
and Legislation.  Their historical order is that in which I have placed 
them."52 
Throughout this course we have been discussing all three of these "instrumentalities."  Is 
Maine correct?  Is he even right about their "historical order?"  The famous hypothesis is 
set out in full in the Materials in Chapter IX .  The judgment is yours.   
 Next is set out Roscoe Pound's famous queries about legal history.  Pound was a 
leader of the "New Jurisprudence" of the twentieth century, the so-called "Sociological 
School," that was discussed at length in Chapter XIV, above.  In this excerpt he 
summarizes the legal history school of the past, and advances his own "overview."  He 
boldly rejects the "evolutionary" nineteenth-century analysis. 
 
"We may well believe, then, that an epoch in Juristic thought has come to 
an end, and that the time is ripe to appraise its work, to ask what of 
permanent value it has achieved, to inquire what are the present demands 
which it is unable to satisfy, and to consider wherein its way of unifying 
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stability and change, with which men were content for a century, is no 
longer of service."53 
In its place he proposes a new perspective on the history of law, a "complex picture" 
informed by "psychology and sociology."  "We must think not in terms of an organism, 
growing because of and by means of some inherent property, but once more, as in the 
eighteenth century, in terms of a building, built…to satisfy human desires and continually 
repaired, restored, rebuilt and added to…."54  What do you think of Pound's argument? 
 Two great American jurists, Holmes and Cardozo, recognized clearly the power 
that history exercises through the law.  They also perceived both the promise and the 
danger that this represents to judges, lawyers, and historians alike.  Included here are 
excerpts from their two best known essays on the relationship between law and history:  
Holmes' essay "The Path of the Law," first given as an address at Boston University 
School of Law in 1897, and Cardozo's famous The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).  
Note Holmes' controversial distinction between law and morals.  Does this view 
influence his attitude toward legal history?  Holmes' view comes from the great 
nineteenth-century legal philosopher, Austin.  Austin's work, and that of his close friend 
Bentham, greatly shaped the social and political attitudes of nineteenth-century lawyers. 
 Following the atrocities of the twentieth century, including mass genocide and the 
resulting Nuremburg trials, the view that law and morals are and should be separate has 
come under attack.  As you read these materials, keep in mind the question of law and 
morals.  Think of how the lawyers of each generation approached this question and the 
institutional "vehicles" they use to solve moral problems.55  Ask yourself if this 
controversy is merely a question of definitions and semantics, or does it say something 
fundamental about the role of law and lawyers during different historical periods? 
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 Note also the view of the great legal historian, Maitland, that lawyers are 
fundamentally "anti-historical."  "The lawyer must be orthodox," wrote Maitland, 
"otherwise he is not a lawyer; and orthodox history seems to me a contradiction in 
terms."56  Even Holmes seems "anti-historical" in this sense.  According to Holmes, "I 
look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall 
be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of 
the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them."57  Ask yourself whether 
Maitland is right about a fundamental contradiction between the intellectual function of 
practicing lawyers and the legal historians.  If so, what is the point of taking this course?  
Remember, according to Holmes, antiquarianism for its own sake is a "pitfall."58 
 Benjamin Cardozo's great Nature of the Judicial Process may come to your 
rescue, at least in terms of providing answers to these questions.  His discussion of the 
source of law in "the creative energy of custom" is particularly valuable. 
 But beware!  Cardozo, a judge, characterizes scientific, rational jurisprudence as 
"the demon of formalism."59  This "demon" is restrained by social policy and 
philosophical justice, applied, of course, by judges.  These judges, in turn, rely on 
Cardozo's four "forces":  history, philosophy, custom, and sociology, to legitimize their 
"flexibility," i.e., their discretionary power.  Doesn't this view deny lawmakers the power 
to rationally plan into the future to achieve predetermined ends, free from the judicial 
arbitrariness and the legal fictions, which, in Holmes' view, has made the study of legal 
history a necessary evil?  Or does this fundamentally misstate Cardozo's views?  What, in 
the end, would Holmes say about Cardozo's arguments? 
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 Throughout these materials, we have encountered a tension between the forces of 
"scientific jurisprudence," which take as their banner the power of human reason and the 
need for over-riding central legislation to make future planning possible, and the forces 
of individualism, whose leit motifs are scepticism of human foresight and fear of 
centralized forces.  Legal history not only tells the tale of this eternal struggle, but 
becomes a valuable weapon, used and abused by both sides.  You will notice that the 
particular philosophic position of a judge or lawyer in this struggle may determine his or 
her view of the "proper role" of legal history.  This will be true, even in your case.  Your 
ultimate view of legal history will probably predict a great deal about the kind of lawyer 
you will become, both professionally and politically, and your study of legal history may 
even influence this future. 
 Concluding these materials are excerpts from Harold J. Berman's "Introduction" 
to his book Law and Revolution (Cambridge, Mass. 1983) and from Laura Kalman's The 
Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (New Haven, 1996).  According to Berman, the 
"history of Western law is at a turning point as sharp and as crucial as that which was 
marked by the French Revolution of 1789 [and] the English Revolution of 1640…"60  
Berman sees part of the reason for this crisis as "cynicism about the law, and lawlessness, 
[which] will not be overcome by adhering to a so-called realism which denies the 
autonomy, the integrity, and the ongoingness of our legal tradition."61  How would 
Berman view the "sociological" and "realist" approaches of Pound and Cardozo?  What 
would he think of Holmes' "Path of the Law?"  Does Berman represent a return to the 
world of Henry Sumner Maine, or something quite different? 
 Laura Kalman leads a new, brilliant generation of legal historians, many of whom 
hold both law degrees and graduate degrees in other disciplines and, perhaps most 
significantly, many of whom, are women.  Some other examples are my own valued 
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colleagues, Mary S. Bilder and Catharine Wells, and Harvard's Christine A. Desan, Mary 
Ann Glendon, and Martha L. Minow.  This generation seeks to use interdisciplinary 
insights to look beyond the history of legal doctrine and use history "with an eye to its 
relevance for the present."62  Kalman repeats Bruce Ackerman's famous challenge that 
the task "is to locate ourselves in a conversation between generations."63  Ackerman 
continues, "I propose. . .the beginning of a dialogue between past and present which will 
serve as our central technique for constitutional discovery."64  What do you think about 
Laura Kalman's description of the "new historicism?"  What does she mean when she 
says that "it would be unfortunate if law professors desert the barricades just as 
academics in other fields, such as historians, begin to show signs of appreciating what 
legal scholars are doing, and wanting to help?"65 
 My view of legal history has been profoundly influenced by Felix Gilbert, a great 
history scholar and teacher.  Gilbert poses this dilemma: 
 
"But what is our situation, for we believe neither in history as a means of 
teaching ethical values nor in the possibility of discovering laws to 
determine the process of world history?"66 
He answers his own question as follows: 
 
Although we may not share the views of nineteenth-century 
historians on the purposes of historical study and what historical 
scholarship might achieve, we are still their heirs insofar as we are 
professors of history, and, as such, accept the framework established more 
than one hundred years ago—that is, recognition of the relationship 
between research and teaching, of the necessity for employing critical 
methods, and of the importance of maintaining professional standards.  As 
remote as we seem to be from the assumptions and expectations of 
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nineteenth-century historical scholarship, certain aspects of the history of 
the professor of history may still be relevant. 
One is the view that history is indivisible and that everything that 
happened in the past belonged to the domain of the professor of history.  
History became an independent and autonomous field of study because it 
was recognized that special methods and procedures were necessary to 
study the past, but also because these methods and procedures were 
regarded as applicable to any aspect and period of the past.  Before the 
nineteenth century history was chiefly an auxiliary science, and as an 
auxiliary to other fields of knowledge, historical study and research will 
always remain alive—now, perhaps, as an aid to political science, 
sociology, and area studies, rather than, as in the past, to moral 
philosophy, theology, or law.  But if historians want their discipline to be 
more than an auxiliary science and to remain an autonomous and 
independent field of study, we should keep in mind that isolating our 
subjects is only one part of our work; the other is to seek for relationships, 
comparisons, and analogies. 
A second aspect of the history of the professor of history is that 
history was expected to provide not only special and factual knowledge, 
but also general insights about the nature of man.  We might not feel that 
we can set our sights as high as that any longer.  But, after all reservations 
have been made, we ought to remain aware that the man who acted and 
was acted upon in the past is the same man who acts in the present, and 
that the past is one way—and not the worst way—of acquiring the right 
and the criteria to judge the present.  Our willingness to see the past as a 
whole, our willingness to take a stand, constitute our card of identity.67 
 I very much agree with Gilbert about his "card of identity," but I am less sure 
that "the past is one way—and not the worst way—of acquiring the right and criteria to 
judge the present." 
 At the conclusion of his great History of English Law, Maitland made the 
following observation: 
 
But of this there can be no doubt, that it was for the good of the whole 
world that one race stood apart from its neighbours, turned away its eyes 
at an early time from the fascinating pages of the Corpus Iuris, and, more 
Roman than the Romanists, made the grand experiment of a new 
formulary system.  Nor can we part with this age without thinking once 
more of the permanence of its work.  Those few men who were gathered 
at Westminster round Pateshull and Raleigh and Bracton were penning 
writs that would run in the name of kingless commonwealths on the other 
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shore of the Atlantic Ocean; they were making right and wrong for us and 
for our children.68 
We now represent the generations of which Maitland spoke, and we are the lawyers of 
those "kingless commonwealths on the other shore of the Atlantic."  We can debate as 
long as we wish the significance of the history of our law, but we cannot escape it.  It 
invades the sentences and the paragraphs of our cases, rules and statutes.  It is, indeed, 
imbedded in the very words we use to describe all we do.  But most of all, this history 
invades our legal culture, the very way we are taught to think.  There is a power in this 
culture.  Must it control us, or can we control it?  Only by our understanding of our past 
can Cardozo's "demon of formalism" and Pound's "political" and "juristic" gods be 
brought to heel.69   
 Understanding of our legal heritage is particularly urgent today, in this "kingless 
commonwealth."  On March 23, 1885, David Dudley Field addressed the graduating 
class of Albany Law School on the topic "Reform in the Legal Profession and the Laws."  
His concluding words to the graduates spoke of the "portals of a new time," and he asks 
"whence shall come the lawgiver of the new time?" 
  
 You stand, moreover, in the very portals of a new time.  The world 
is soon to take its impulses from this side of the ocean.  The language we 
speak, the institutions in which we participate, are to spread with our 
dominion— 
 From the World's girdle to the frozen pole—and beyond our 
dominion to remote islands and continents.  Whence shall come the 
lawgiver of the new time?  From our own soil, I would fain hope and 
believe.  The materials are at hand, and the time is propitious.  A new 
people, grown suddenly to the strength and civilization of the oldest and 
mightiest, with laws for the most part borrowed, finds that they need to be 
reexamined, simplified, and reconstructed.  The task is great, the object is 
greater, and the reward is ample.  Let us, then, be up and doing, that we 
may have the merit and the satisfaction of having accomplished something 
toward it, before we rest from our labors.70 
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There is a touch of imperialism in these sentences, but, like Field's graduates, we surely 
do stand on the "portals of a new time," a time whose rate of change, opportunities and 
dangers far exceed even the propitious and perilous years that followed Field's 1855 
address.  And there can be no doubt from "whence shall come the lawgivers of the new 
time," for they are you. 
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FOR FURTHER READING 
I.  THE "NEW JURISPRUDENCE" 
 See the classic articulation of the "New Jurisprudence" in Henry Steele 
Commager, The American Mind:  An Interpretation of American Thought and Character 
Since the 1880's (New Haven, 1950) 374-390.  There is also a good summary of the 
historical context in an "Epilogue:  American Law in the 20th Century" in Lawrence M. 
Friedman, A History of America's Law (New York, 2d. ed., 1985) 655-695. 
 Friedman has called Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s The Common Law (Boston, 
1881) "the most important 19th century [law] book."  Id., 545.  But, as Commager 
pointed out, Holmes' "thought was a generation ahead of his time,"  and Holmes only 
began his thirty years on the Supreme Court in 1902.  See Henry Steele Commager, The 
American Mind, supra, 376.  Thus, Holmes was a genuine figure of the twentieth century.  
The Common Law remains in print.  See the excellent edition by Mark DeWolfe Howe, 
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (ed. M. DeWolfe Howe, London, 1968).  Also 
powerfully impressive are Holmes' less well known legal addresses, including several on 
legal scholarship and the legal profession in O.W. Holmes, Speeches (Boston, 1891).  See 
also O.W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (Harold J. Laski ed., New York, 1920).  
Holmes' brilliance is also preserved in his great correspondence with Sir Frederick 
Pollock and with Harold Laski.  See Holmes - Pollock Letters (ed. Mark De Wolfe Howe, 
Cambridge, 1961); Holmes - Laski Letters 1916-1935 (ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, 
Cambridge, 1923).  See also "The Early Critical and Philosophical Writings of Justice 
Holmes" (ed. with introduction by Michael H. Hoffheimer, 30 Boston College Law 
Review (1989) 1221).  For a modern analysis, see the incomparable Holmes Lectures of 
1981 of Benjamin Kaplan, Patrick Atiyah, and Jay Vetter printed in Holmes and The 
Common Law:  A Century Later (Cambridge, 1983).  There is also David J. Seipp's 
brilliant essay on the 125th anniversary of "The Path of the Law."  See David J. Seipp, 
"Holmes's Path," 77 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 515 (1997), and the fine work of my valued 
 
27
colleague, Catharine Wells.  See Catharine P. Wells, "Old-Fashioned Postmodernism and 
the Legal Theories of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.," 63 Brooklyn Law Rev. 63 (1997).  
Finally, there is Catherine Drinker Bowen's wonderful Yankee from Olympus (Boston, 
1944), a biography as insightful as it is accessible. 
 There are many surviving books and articles of Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), 
including his monumental five volume Jurisprudence (Cambridge, 1959).  By far the 
most important, however, is the little treatise containing a series of his lectures called The 
Spirit of the Common Law (Cambridge, 1921).  See also Pound's Interpretations of Legal 
History (Cambridge, 1923), his famous Trinity College, Cambridge, lecture of 1922.  The 
scholarly biography is Paul L. Sayre, Life of Roscoe Pound  (Iowa City, 1948).  For a 
guide to the great canon of Supreme Court decisions and articles by Louis Dembitz 
Brandeis, see Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis, A Free Man's Life (New York, 1946). 
II. "POST-LIBERAL SOCIETY"  
 The patron saint of modern law analysis remains Max Weber (1869-1920).  See 
particularly his Law in Economy and Society (trans. From Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft by 
Shik) (Rheinstein, ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1969).  See also Max Weber, General 
Economic History (trans. Knight, New York, 1961), 249-258.  The leading contemporary 
commentator on the legal characteristics of "post liberal society" is Roberto Mangaberia 
Unger who, with other scholars such as Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz, formed 
the "critical legal studies" group at Harvard in the late 1970s.  See Roberto M. Unger's 
Law in Modern Society (New York, 1976) and Knowledge and Politics (New York, 
1975), Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law:  1780-1860 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1977), and Duncan Kennedy's, Legal Education and the Reproduction of 
Hierarchy (Cambridge, Mass., 1983). 
 For those wishing to complete their overview of English developments up through 
the aftermath of World War II, see R.M. Jackson's classic The Machinery of Justice in 
England (Cambridge, 1940), Sir Carleton Kemp Allen's equally distinguished Law and 
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Orders (3d ed., London, 1965) and Robert Stevens' fascinating Law and Politics:  The 
House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976 (Chapel Hill, 1978). 
III. "LAW AND HISTORY" 
 A concise bibliography covering most of the recent controversies about legal 
history, from Grant Gilmore's "The Age of Antiquarius:  On Legal History in the Time of 
Troubles" to Robert W. Gordon's "Historicism in Legal Scholarship" can be found in the 
notes to the excerpt from my "Introduction" to Law in Colonial Massachusetts set out 
below in the Materials.  Laura Kalman's The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale, 
1996), published since my "Introduction," is worth reading from cover to cover.  There is 
also a great new scholarly biography of Cardozo by Andrew Kaufman.  See Andrew L. 
Kaufman, Cardozo (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).  
 
 
  
